Ross commented on Noah Feldman’s article on Mormonism recently, which reminded me that I had also wanted to respond to one part of it and arguments like the following:
Still, even among those who respect Mormons personally, it is still common to hear Mormonism’s tenets dismissed as ridiculous. This attitude is logically indefensible insofar as Mormonism is being compared with other world religions. There is nothing inherently less plausible about God’s revealing himself to an upstate New York farmer in the early years of the Republic than to the pharaoh’s changeling grandson in ancient Egypt.
Put that way, Feldman might have a point, except that the claim of new revelation is actually the least “ridiculous” part of the story. It is, and always has been, the content of that revelation that has drawn the most criticism, and so for the most part the majority dutifully ignores or downplays how the content of this or that religion is theologically untenable. To do otherwise would begin us down the road to taking one set of theological claims more seriously than another, which might even (gasp!) lead us to assign different significance and measures of truth to different sets of claims. The problem with this argument is that, for the sake of promoting toleration for minority religions, it essentially grants that every religion is just as inherently plausible as any other, which not only makes discussion of doctrine pointless, but actually impedes the possibility of religious dialogue and persuasion. Granting this equality of religions paves the way for exactly the kind of arational sectarianism that skeptics believe is unavoidable with religion in public life.
There is this very strange attitude about religion out there, and it is held by more than a few observant Christians as well as secular skeptics, that says that no revelation is more plausible than any other, which implies that revelation is entirely outside the realm of rational discouse and demonstration. This is essentially fideism or a kind of neo-Barlaamism, which holds that believers should hold to their traditional faiths primarily because they are ancient–there is nothing that we can actually say rationally about a doctrine of God. One of the reasons why this bizarre idea can gain such currency is the lack of respect people have for theology and dogma. In our culture, if you want to dismiss someone’s position, you say that he is being dogmatic, and if you want to discredit an argument you refer to his worldview as a “theology,” preferably preceded by adjectives such as arcane.
Such is the depth of our divorce from Christian intellectual tradition that many people do not recognise the substantive difference between an elaborately reasoned theological view and the ramblings of a science-fiction author. Simply put, we lack discernment. Militant atheists are at least consistent in the implications of holding such a disparaging view of revelation–for them, it is all made-up and undeserving of any respect. Out of some misplaced sense of solidarity with other religious people against the Christopher Hitchenses and Dawkinses of the world, Christians seem to feel obliged to make general defenses of generic theism or the even more amorphous category of Religion, and woe betide the bishop who attempts, as Pope Benedict did, to illustrate the implications of radically different doctrines of God. This then forces these Christians to argue that all these things are purely a matter of faith, where faith is defined not only as something inspired and the result of God’s grace (which it is), but also as something arational, rather than understanding that it is faith rightly understood that is the highest form of rationality. Having conceded the high ground and having bought into a functionally extreme apophaticism, the Christian finds himself at a loss to make any argument from revelation, because he has already effectively granted that speaking kataphatically is impossible. Trying to include everyone in a big tent of ecumenical anti-secularism eventually leads to being unable to say something about God and maintain that it is actually true, when there is nothing more fundamental to preaching and evangelising than speaking the truth about God in prayer and homilies.
This brings me, oddly enough, to the question of evolution. Fideistic understandings of religion and materialistic philosophies that seek to exploit evolutionary biology to their advantage enjoy a symbiotic relationship, since they both thrive on promoting mutual antagonism between reason and faith. Tell the Christian that he must either endorse evolutionary theory or accept the Bible, and he will typically take the Bible, especially if he is not grounded in an authoritative teaching tradition that tells him that this choice is a false one. Tell the average educated secular person that revealed religion is incompatible with scientific theory, and he may very well conclude that those who continue to adhere to revealed religion must be either ignorant, insane or up to no good. Huckabee is someone who falls into the former category, of course, and declares himself agnostic on ”how” God works in creation, which is actually a far more honest view–and one that a majority of Americans would share–than affirming evolutionary theory because you know that it is socially unacceptable in certain circles to admit that you don’t understand or accept the theory. As Rod has said before, evolution serves as a “cultural marker,” and it is deployed as a litmus test to see whether you belong to a certain kind of educated elite. Ironically, the cultural bias against dogmatism and theology in religion has come around and struck science by making it permissible, even admirable, to doubt statements made with certainty. Were it not for the tendency of many religious and secular Americans to oppose reason and faith, there would be no difficulty in affirming the truth of revelation and recognising the reasonable, albeit always provisional, nature of scientific inquiry. Obviously, approaches to faith that prize doubt and uncertainty simply reinforce the tendency towards extreme apophaticism and fideism that make it impossible for believers and non-believers to speak intelligibly to one another (to the extent that people working in two significantly different traditions can speak to one another).
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January 9th, 2008 at 3:16 pm
hisownfool
Well said, Mr. Larison. I have been chagrined and even annoyed at Christians who, mostly in support of governor Romney’s candidacy, have equated belief in the Incarnation or the resurrection with Mormon teachings that “lost” Israelites (and Jesus) wandered around in pre-Columbian America or stories about “reformed Egyptian” and “translating spectacles.” The message seems to be “who are we to call someone’s beliefs irrational?”
All I can do is sigh and direct them to, among other thing, the Pope’s address at Regensburg and Fides et Ratio. Not that it makes any difference.
January 9th, 2008 at 3:23 pm
Roach
I find two religious views very irrational.
First, the Mormon belief in the Total Apostasy. There is no evidence for this coutnerfactual alleged history, unless one believes the Arians were right, which may actually be plausible int he case of Mormons.
Two, the general Protestant view that somehow Christianity had been getting it wrong for 1,500 years until they showed up to promote a totally alien, unhierarchical, and au courant Christianity that rejected centuries-old views going back to the Gospels on Transubstantiation, Marian virginity, Marian veneration, grace and free will, sacramental theology, etc.
I do think a thread uniting much “rationalist” skepticism is a kind of Manichean and non-rational separation of matters material and matters spiritual. Anything in this world has not spiritual essence in this view. This of course is a logical outgrowth of the rejection of sacraments, where we have visible and tangible signs of invisible grace, much like the blind man woman who touched Jesus cloak and was instantly healed (among many such matter-spiritual episodes in the Gospels).
January 9th, 2008 at 3:42 pm
M.Z. Forrest
Persistance is not a bad qualifier of truth. It is how we test many truth claims. That one can dismiss Mormonism in other ways is of course true.
January 9th, 2008 at 5:03 pm
Justin
I’m aiming to write something on this subject, but the question which I’m both personally curious about, as well as the one that I think ought to provoke difficulties for your view, is “what stance do you take towards the truth of the Bible? Broadly speaking, which parts of it as to be taken as candidates for literal truth in this test?” Where do you fit in between “just the resurrection” and “every damn word?”
I say that it’s a tricky question, because both Mormons and Christians, if they’re to be credible, have to view parts of their holy book as parables, allegories, or just a story.
January 9th, 2008 at 5:29 pm
Roach
Thankfully for Catholics and Orthodox, we believe in the co-equal authority of the Magesterium which says parts are literal, allegories, etc.
January 9th, 2008 at 6:19 pm
Daniel Larison
Thanks, Chris. I was going to make that point, but you’ve already summed it up well. Both teachings of the Church’s alleged apostasy, whether LDS or Reformed, are irrational in their way in that they require one to dissociate institutional and historical reality from its spiritual moorings. On theological grounds they are untenable–how is it that God gave the Church His Holy Spirit but then allowed the Church to fall into such complete error? Of course, He did not.
Incidentally, even though that YouTube debate question was a Democratic plant the question about the Bible was interesting. Based on what Romney said in his speech, this was a question about church teaching and doctrine that he believes is inappropriate, but he answered the question anyway. The authority of Scripture is absolutely a purely theological and ecclesiological matter, but he accepted that it was appropriate to talk about that, but not about the rather more controversial bits.
January 9th, 2008 at 7:29 pm
rokurota
Question (I suspect I’m about to reveal some ignorance here, so anyone feel free to pitch in, thanks in advance):
You wrote: “…Feldman might have a point, except that the claim of new revelation is actually the least ‘ridiculous’ part of the story. It is, and always has been, the content of that revelation that has drawn the most criticism, and so for the most part the majority dutifully ignores or downplays how the content of this or that religion is theologically untenable.”
By what criteria should we argue that “this or that religion” is theologically untenable? Because as an empirical matter Mormon theology has proven to be spectacularly tenable: ever increasing millions of educated, non-coerced people live their lives happily believing and defending it. If on the other hand you mean only that it is untenable because you personally do not find it logical/consistent/plausible or whatever, what special authority do you (or any other individual citizens) have? Example: I was raised in an evangelical Christian household, and while I personally find Christian theology untenable (preposterous, actually), I think it would be rather arrogant of me to declare it untenable in general.
January 10th, 2008 at 7:36 am
Roach
Daniel, I, and any thinking person has a capacity called “reason.” This allows one to see illogic, inconsistency, contradiction, etc.
January 14th, 2008 at 1:48 pm
Rod Blaine
[I originally posted this chez Ross Douthat’s http://tinyurl.com/25tda8 - but it fits better here, though…]
On the question of relative weirdness of doctrines… Daniel C Dennett, in his much-quoted “playing tennis with the net down” argument, claims that all appeals to the supernatural are equally out of court (in both senses); that once you accept that any metaphysical forces at all (God, gods, karma) exist, all statements about them are equally implausible.
I don’t accept this. For example, while I’m not Catholic or Pentecostal, I believe that claims about healings at Lourdes or your local megachurch deserve more respect from rationalists and skeptics, even from outright atheists - being harder to debunk - than, eg, the claims to godhood of ancient emperors. I’m not an Egyptian polytheist or a Mormon, but a doctrine that the gods helped build the pyramids is more difficult to refute than a claim that American Indians are descended from ancient Israelites. Hal Lindsay and the Jehovah’s Witnesses, who predicted the End of the World on dates that have already passed, are (even) easier to refute than someone who claims that it won’t happen until we all get microchipped in the hand or forehead. A claim that there’s a sea monster in Loch Ness is harder to laugh off than a claim that there’s a sea monster in your washbasin. And so forth.
Even rationalists themselves concede that not all religions are equally implausible. Quite often one reads skeptics (eg, Gibbon) writing something on Islam that boils down to “Well, sure, it is tosh, but at least it’s minimalist tosh - at least the Muslims don’t ask you to swallow such bizarre doctrines as transubstantiation, the Trinity, magical priestly powers, etc.” Similarly, Voltaire thought thatthe Reformation’s getting rid of superstitious Catholic dogmas was a good first step, he thought, but the Protestants would do even better if they went further still, stripped away the superstitious Biblical mumbo-jumbo too, and got back to simple, naturally-reasoned Deism. I even doubt that Dennett himself would consider Bishop Spong’s or the Unitarian Universalists’ belief in some form of [d]eity to be as obviously laughable - to them - as the elderly Italian lady with her scapular and Sacred Heart icons.
January 14th, 2008 at 2:24 pm
Rod Blaine
… er, “laughable - to him”. I strictly uphold the Oneness of Daniel C Dennett.