Comments on: Pessimism, Again http://larison.org/2007/09/03/pessimism-again/ n. the principle of good order "Observe the strange inversion of all order and sense! Dignity debased; how vilely is the function of a consul prostituted!" ~The Craftsman Sun, 01 Aug 2010 07:31:25 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.0.4 by: empiricus http://larison.org/2007/09/03/pessimism-again/#comment-7587 Tue, 04 Sep 2007 06:33:20 +0000 http://larison.org/2007/09/03/pessimism-again/#comment-7587 Eh, I'm rather less taken with Prof. Deneen's critique, which seems to be attacking a strawman of Prof. Dienstag's book (which I read a year or so ago, so it's quite possible that I don't remember it as well as I ought). But then, I've never found Prof. Deneen to be particularly worth reading, and the linked piece with its proofs by belligerent assertion does nothing to change that opinion. However, I (a secular pessimist) have always found you tremendously well worth reading (and I thought your series on Dienstag excellent, more than fair to Diesntag's argument). So I will ask you to expound further on your view of Christian hope. I disagree with your characterization of optimism (which seems to me to be conflated with Arminianism, which is indeed an optimistic soteriology); an optimist thinks/believes/acts in accordance with the idea that the Cubs will win the World series, without regard for what reason or experience teach us about the likelihood of that outcome, but without a necessary belief that the outcome depends on the optimist's actions. A fan _hopes_ the Cubs will win (which may require divine intervention). So the position of your hopeful Christian, “I may yet be saved, if it be God’s will.”, is as far as I can tell consistent with all of said Christian's presumed premises (with some semantic fuzz on the tense structure viz unconditional preservation of the saints for extreme Calvinists), but it seems orthogonal to the optimism/pessimism axis, which would relate to the Christian's estimation of the _likelihood_ that he (or any given other person or persons, for that matter) is or will be saved. I had the impression that the theological virtue of hope is supposed to reside the Christian's belief in the possibility of (his and others') salvation in spite of the selfsame Christian's awareness (see above, reason and experience) of death, sin, his own sinfulness, etc. That seems to be completely unrelated to optimism or pessimism - other than how Christian conceptions such as original sin _guarantee_ the impossibility of this-worldly "salvation", whereas reason and experience just lead the secular pessimist to conclude that this-worldly "salvation" is wildly improbable, not a priori impossible. Is that the crucial difference? By the way, speaking solely for myself of course, I do not "deny all meaning". I do indeed consider the available evidence insufficient to infer a transcendental ground of meaning, at least for most common uses of "transcendental". But you're quite correct in that I don't see my secular pessimism as empty. I'm not sure what you mean by "seeing secular pessimism as possibility", so I can't answer to that. Again, many thanks for the kind words for us happy few, the secular pessimists. Eh, I’m rather less taken with Prof. Deneen’s critique, which seems to be attacking a strawman of Prof. Dienstag’s book (which I read a year or so ago, so it’s quite possible that I don’t remember it as well as I ought). But then, I’ve never found Prof. Deneen to be particularly worth reading, and the linked piece with its proofs by belligerent assertion does nothing to change that opinion.

However, I (a secular pessimist) have always found you tremendously well worth reading (and I thought your series on Dienstag excellent, more than fair to Diesntag’s argument). So I will ask you to expound further on your view of Christian hope.

I disagree with your characterization of optimism (which seems to me to be conflated with Arminianism, which is indeed an optimistic soteriology); an optimist thinks/believes/acts in accordance with the idea that the Cubs will win the World series, without regard for what reason or experience teach us about the likelihood of that outcome, but without a necessary belief that the outcome depends on the optimist’s actions. A fan _hopes_ the Cubs will win (which may require divine intervention).

So the position of your hopeful Christian, “I may yet be saved, if it be God’s will.”, is as far as I can tell consistent with all of said Christian’s presumed premises (with some semantic fuzz on the tense structure viz unconditional preservation of the saints for extreme Calvinists), but it seems orthogonal to the optimism/pessimism axis, which would relate to the Christian’s estimation of the _likelihood_ that he (or any given other person or persons, for that matter) is or will be saved. I had the impression that the theological virtue of hope is supposed to reside the Christian’s belief in the possibility of (his and others’) salvation in spite of the selfsame Christian’s awareness (see above, reason and experience) of death, sin, his own sinfulness, etc. That seems to be completely unrelated to optimism or pessimism - other than how Christian conceptions such as original sin _guarantee_ the impossibility of this-worldly “salvation”, whereas reason and experience just lead the secular pessimist to conclude that this-worldly “salvation” is wildly improbable, not a priori impossible. Is that the crucial difference?

By the way, speaking solely for myself of course, I do not “deny all meaning”. I do indeed consider the available evidence insufficient to infer a transcendental ground of meaning, at least for most common uses of “transcendental”. But you’re quite correct in that I don’t see my secular pessimism as empty. I’m not sure what you mean by “seeing secular pessimism as possibility”, so I can’t answer to that.

Again, many thanks for the kind words for us happy few, the secular pessimists.

]]>