the issue is of course quantitative, not qualitative. e.g., german exhibited a decline in material conditions during the first half of the 17th century for obvious geopolitical reasons. but other parts of europe were far less traumatized, and, what would the magnitude of any aggregate quantitative decline be across western christendom? ward-perkins makes the case, to my eye, that the quantitative decline in most of what was once the western empire in the production of materials was on the order of magnitudes (e.g., the disappearance of whole pottery forms, or decline to negligibility).

But all of western Europe was subject to tramatic geopolitical shifts just as large as what Germany during the 30-years-war: barbarian invasions, civil wars and plagues from from the previous centuries–much of which took place under pagan rule in the third century–had disastrously worn away the structure of the Roman system.

Now I’m aware of arguments from scholars like Michael Grant who say Christianity’s otherworldiness had a delterious effect as well, but looking at the system, which almost collapsed in the second century, it’s clear that it was heading for a fall, as happens to all empires. What’s remarkable about this situation is that, despite all the disasters that hit Western Europe, something very real was not only recovered, but added to within a couple centuries.

do you know what filter they’re using? or is it specific?

look. you need to read my post.

first, the post does not addresses the causes of decline at all. i am clear that that is not the brief of the book. second, i am not addressing christians in the least with my comment. my reference to the “proust of the papuans” makes clear who i’m talking about….

yes, as i implied in my post. i should have made clear that he denies byzantium declined during his period of focus on the west (though it never fell).

is a bit of a cheap shot. Whatever your opinion of Christianity, surely it did not cause the contraction of the Roman world.

it would help if you read the whole post so that you could understand the context that i said that in. i’m not so stupid to make such causal connection anyhow. but thanks for allowing your fantasy telepathy to kick into high gear!

p.s., the fact that i have a book like A History of the Byzantine State and Society on my blogroll as ‘highly recommended,’ or that i did a Q & A with the should clue people in to the fact that i’m not anti-byzantine.

Razib:
Ward-Perkins does endorse economic decline in Byzantium, but it comes later than than that in the western Empire. Obviously, the Gibbonesque model doesn’t apply, but his work does describe (from memory) a sixth and seventh century decline in the Byzantine economy coincident with plague and Arab invasion.

Also, it is my recollection from Braudel that the general European standard of living began declining in the 16th century, not the 17th. The great period of conflict, or of state formation, if one prefers, but definitely the one of general European immiseration, arguably stretches from 1494 to at least the Peace of Westphalia, a period marked by religious and political strife at every level, from civil wars in England and France, massive revolts in Spain and Germany, frequent coalition wars, Ottoman depredation, and rising taxes, inflation, and state coercion.

Finally, I can’t help but think that this:

Frankly, to me this is reminiscent of Communist era attempts to dismiss the consumer cornucopia of the capitalist world by suggesting that socialist man was spiritually richer if materially poorer. ~Razib

is a bit of a cheap shot. Whatever your opinion of Christianity, surely it did not cause the contraction of the Roman world.

the issue is of course quantitative, not qualitative. e.g., german exhibited a decline in material conditions during the first half of the 17th century for obvious geopolitical reasons. but other parts of europe were far less traumatized, and, what would the magnitude of any aggregate quantitative decline be across western christendom? ward-perkins makes the case, to my eye, that the quantitative decline in most of what was once the western empire in the production of materials was on the order of magnitudes (e.g., the disappearance of whole pottery forms, or decline to negligibility). on the other hand, multiplicative contractions below 10 are worth attention, but they might not be large enough to be termed a “break.”

first, ward-perkins endorses this correction.

second, he basically denies that byzantium (or what became byzantium) ever declined. rather, his focus re: decline & fall is upon the western roman empire. he acknowledges that decline & fall is totally inappropriate as a model for byzantium. or, at least the decline did not occur until the rise of islam before the renaissance of the 10th century.

third, he follows peter heather is denying that the 4th century was really one of decline or weakness. rather, he seems to focus on the 5th and 6th centuries, so some of your comments need to shift their timescale 100 years into the future.

fourth, unlike you (and like me) ward-perkins is a secularist, so his own lack of interest in church councils and the christianization of classical civilization seems obviously attenuated. norms do matter. but from the quotations (looking at the notes) it seems that he is fixated on a putatively areligious scholarly community that is motivated by a combination of post modernist tinged relativism as well as a germanic ethnically rooted apologia.