The United States has gone far out on a limb to allow Israel to win and for all this to happen. It has counted on Israel’s ability to do the job. It has been disappointed. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has provided unsteady and uncertain leadership. Foolishly relying on air power alone, he denied his generals the ground offensive they wanted, only to reverse himself later. He has allowed his war cabinet meetings to become fully public through the kind of leaks no serious wartime leadership would ever countenance. Divisive cabinet debates are broadcast to the world, as was Olmert’s own complaint that “I’m tired. I didn’t sleep at all last night” (Haaretz, July 28). Hardly the stuff to instill Churchillian confidence.

His search for victory on the cheap has jeopardized not just the Lebanon operation but America’s confidence in Israel as well. That confidence — and the relationship it reinforces — is as important to Israel’s survival as its own army. The tremulous Olmert seems not to have a clue. ~Charles Krauthammer, The Washington Post

This article got my attention for two reasons.  First, it raised the possibility that Israel’s strategic value to the United States may not necessarily be so great and that it could be, in the present age, a real liability.  National interest might dictate a reassessment of the whole relationship and the latitude America gives Israel.  I doubt Krauthammer believes Israel to be a liability, and he is probably horrified at the prospect of any significant change in American policy towards Israel, but there is clearly the worry that other people in the country, and maybe in Washington, are beginning to see things that way–and it is no longer off-limits to talk about such things publicly. 

The second thing that caught my eye was the strident contempt Krauthammer had for Olmert.  It is becoming fashionable among supporters of the campaign, such as Bret Stephens earlier this week, to ridicule the Olmert government for missing opportunities and poor leadership, and there is certainly something to all of this (though I am critical of the Olmert government for having done as much as it has done, not for failing to do more!), but coming from someone who typically regards wartime criticism of American government leaders as vaguely treasonous this is more than a little surprising.  If he were talking about America, and you replace Olmert with Bush and Lebanon with Iraq, it is difficult to imagine such intense criticism of even so markedly incompetent an administration as Mr. Bush’s–certainly not this early in the war!  But with the Krauthammers of the world there is always the possibility of invoking Chamberlain clause: if you fight hesitantly or ineffectively, we will trash you and look for our Churchill in the backbenches. 

While we’re at it, let’s be clear about something else: if this were any other government than a Kadima government, whose peace policy Krauthammer and the neocons despise and whom they blame for the policy leading to these conflicts, the criticism would be a lot less intense.  Olmert broke with Likud and helped Sharon reduce that party to the insignificant status it now enjoys, and this has got to rankle the Stateside friends of Likud; as much as they lament Olmert’s incompetence, I think they are also relishing this chance to discredit and mock him.